Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri Sch. Dist.: Missouri Expands the Scope of Sexual Harassment Claims under the MHRA - Richard D. Worth Labor and Employment Law Blog on Lawyers.com
Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri Sch. Dist.: Missouri Expands the Scope of Sexual Harassment Claims under the MHRA - Richard D. Worth Labor and Employment Law Blog on Lawyers.com
Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri Sch. Dist.: Missouri Expands the Scope of Sexual Harassment Claims under the MHRA
Thursday, April 19, 2012 by Richard D. Worth
Until a recent decision
by the Missouri Court of Appeals, no Missouri
case had addressed whether the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) covers a
claim against a public school district for sex discrimination based upon
student-on-student sexual harassment. The
decision in Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas
City, Missouri Sch.
Dist. made clear that such a claim falls directly within the purview of the
MHRA, Section 213.065.
by the Missouri Court of Appeals, no Missouri
case had addressed whether the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) covers a
claim against a public school district for sex discrimination based upon
student-on-student sexual harassment. The
decision in Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas
City, Missouri Sch.
Dist. made clear that such a claim falls directly within the purview of the
MHRA, Section 213.065.
John Doe was a
student at Swinney Elementary School, which is part of the Kansas City, Missouri
School District (“School District”). In October 2010, Doe filed a Petition against
the School District alleging that the District failed to protect him from
sexual harassment and sexual assault by a fellow student, which constituted sex
discrimination that deprived him of the full, free and equal use and enjoyment
of the School District's elementary school, a
public accommodation.
student at Swinney Elementary School, which is part of the Kansas City, Missouri
School District (“School District”). In October 2010, Doe filed a Petition against
the School District alleging that the District failed to protect him from
sexual harassment and sexual assault by a fellow student, which constituted sex
discrimination that deprived him of the full, free and equal use and enjoyment
of the School District's elementary school, a
public accommodation.
Doe alleged that
beginning in May 2009, he was sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by
another student on multiple occasions during school hours and on school
grounds. Doe asserted the perpetrator
climbed under the stalls in the boys' restroom to commit the sexual harassment
and sexual assaults. Doe further alleged
that school administrators, as well as the teachers and paraprofessionals
responsible for supervising him and the perpetrator, had knowledge of the
perpetrator's inappropriate and sexualized behavior and his aggressive
tendencies. Despite knowledge of the
perpetrator's sexual tendencies, school personnel permitted the perpetrator to
use the restroom at the same time as other male students. Consequently, the perpetrator had the opportunity
to sexually harass and sexually assault him.
Doe contended that, as a result of the sexual harassment and sexual
assaults, he experienced emotional distress in the form of anxiety, fear and
depression, among other manifestations.
beginning in May 2009, he was sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by
another student on multiple occasions during school hours and on school
grounds. Doe asserted the perpetrator
climbed under the stalls in the boys' restroom to commit the sexual harassment
and sexual assaults. Doe further alleged
that school administrators, as well as the teachers and paraprofessionals
responsible for supervising him and the perpetrator, had knowledge of the
perpetrator's inappropriate and sexualized behavior and his aggressive
tendencies. Despite knowledge of the
perpetrator's sexual tendencies, school personnel permitted the perpetrator to
use the restroom at the same time as other male students. Consequently, the perpetrator had the opportunity
to sexually harass and sexually assault him.
Doe contended that, as a result of the sexual harassment and sexual
assaults, he experienced emotional distress in the form of anxiety, fear and
depression, among other manifestations.
Doe asserted the
School District's acts and omissions violated
the MHRA, Chapter 213, RSMo.
Specifically, he alleged the sexual harassment and sexual assaults
occurred on the basis of his gender and constituted sex discrimination. He further claimed that Swinney
Elementary School, as part of the
School District, was a public place of accommodation, and that he was deprived
of the full, free and equal use and enjoyment of the school and its services by
way of the School District's actions and
inactions.
School District's acts and omissions violated
the MHRA, Chapter 213, RSMo.
Specifically, he alleged the sexual harassment and sexual assaults
occurred on the basis of his gender and constituted sex discrimination. He further claimed that Swinney
Elementary School, as part of the
School District, was a public place of accommodation, and that he was deprived
of the full, free and equal use and enjoyment of the school and its services by
way of the School District's actions and
inactions.
The School District moved to dismiss Doe's Petition. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted
the School District’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Doe failed to state a
cause of action under the MHRA against the School District. Doe thereafter appealed the decision.
the School District’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Doe failed to state a
cause of action under the MHRA against the School District. Doe thereafter appealed the decision.
On appeal, the
Missouri Court of Appeals relied upon Section 213.065 of the MHRA, which
provides in relevant part:
Missouri Court of Appeals relied upon Section 213.065 of the MHRA, which
provides in relevant part:
- All persons within the
jurisdiction of the state of Missouri
are free and equal and shall be entitled to the full and equal use and
enjoyment within this state of any place of public accommodation, as
hereinafter defined, without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability. - It is an unlawful discriminatory
practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or
deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold from or deny any other
person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or
privileges made available in any place of public accommodation, as defined in
section 213.010 and this section, or to segregate or discriminate against any
such person in the use thereof on the grounds of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability. - The
provisions of this section shall not apply to…a place of accommodation…or other
establishment which is not in fact open to the public. . . .
Section
213.010(15) defines “places of public accommodation” as “all places or
businesses offering or holding out to the general public, goods, services,
privileges, facilities, advantages or accommodations for the peace, comfort,
health, welfare and safety of the general public or such public places
providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement[.]”
213.010(15) defines “places of public accommodation” as “all places or
businesses offering or holding out to the general public, goods, services,
privileges, facilities, advantages or accommodations for the peace, comfort,
health, welfare and safety of the general public or such public places
providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement[.]”
The Missouri appellate court
noted that whether Section 213.065 covers a claim against a public school
district for sex discrimination based upon student-on-student sexual harassment
is a matter of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain the legislature's intent from the language used
and to give effect to that intent.
Courts must interpret statutes consistently with the legislature's
obvious purpose. In ascertaining that
purpose, courts should not read statutory provisions in isolation but, rather,
they should construe the provisions of a legislative act together and read a
questioned phrase in harmony with the entire act.
noted that whether Section 213.065 covers a claim against a public school
district for sex discrimination based upon student-on-student sexual harassment
is a matter of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain the legislature's intent from the language used
and to give effect to that intent.
Courts must interpret statutes consistently with the legislature's
obvious purpose. In ascertaining that
purpose, courts should not read statutory provisions in isolation but, rather,
they should construe the provisions of a legislative act together and read a
questioned phrase in harmony with the entire act.
The court
further noted that Section 213.065 is a remedial statute. Therefore, courts should interpret it
liberally to include those cases which are within the spirit of the law and all
reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.
further noted that Section 213.065 is a remedial statute. Therefore, courts should interpret it
liberally to include those cases which are within the spirit of the law and all
reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.
With this in
mind, the School District argued on appeal that public schools are specifically
excluded as places of public accommodation by Section 213.065.3 because they
are “not in fact open to the public” because members of the general public do
not have unfettered and unlimited access to them. Accordingly, the issue on appeal was whether
a place of public accommodation must be accessible by all members of
the public to be “open to the public.”
mind, the School District argued on appeal that public schools are specifically
excluded as places of public accommodation by Section 213.065.3 because they
are “not in fact open to the public” because members of the general public do
not have unfettered and unlimited access to them. Accordingly, the issue on appeal was whether
a place of public accommodation must be accessible by all members of
the public to be “open to the public.”
In analyzing the
issue, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained that Missouri courts have long considered public
school districts to be both subdivisions of the State and public
corporations. In addition, prior case
law has specifically recognized “that an entity can be said to serve the public
even if it serves only a subset or segment of the public and is subject to
regulation on that basis.” The court
therefore found that limiting the phrase “open to the public” in Section
213.165.3 to mean accessible by all members of the populace would be
contrary to the legislature's intent and would effectively nullify the
prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations. As such, the court held that because Doe
alleged that Swinney Elementary School was a public facility that was
owned, operated or managed by a public school district, which was a subdivision
of the State of Missouri and a public
corporation, he sufficiently pled that Swinney Elementary School
was a place of public accommodation.
issue, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained that Missouri courts have long considered public
school districts to be both subdivisions of the State and public
corporations. In addition, prior case
law has specifically recognized “that an entity can be said to serve the public
even if it serves only a subset or segment of the public and is subject to
regulation on that basis.” The court
therefore found that limiting the phrase “open to the public” in Section
213.165.3 to mean accessible by all members of the populace would be
contrary to the legislature's intent and would effectively nullify the
prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations. As such, the court held that because Doe
alleged that Swinney Elementary School was a public facility that was
owned, operated or managed by a public school district, which was a subdivision
of the State of Missouri and a public
corporation, he sufficiently pled that Swinney Elementary School
was a place of public accommodation.
In his Petition,
Doe also asserted that the School District was liable under the “indirect”
theory set forth in Section 213.065.2, as he claimed that the School District,
by its actions and inactions in failing to protect him from the harassment and
assaults, was responsible for denying him the full and equal use and enjoyment
of the public school and its services. The
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that because Section 213.065.2 alternatively
prohibits a person from “indirectly” denying the benefits of a public
accommodation, the statute also contemplates liability for a party who does not
personally engaged in the discriminatory acts but who is responsible for the
denial of the advantages, facilities, services or privileges of a public
accommodation that results from another's discriminatory acts. The court noted that a school district
exercises significant control over its students through its disciplinary
policy. And because it has such control
over its students, a school district's failure to take prompt and effective
remedial action to address a student's sexually harassing and sexually
assaulting another student has the potential to deny the aggrieved student the
full and equal use and enjoyment of the advantages, facilities, services and
privileges of the public school. Thus, the
court found that the Section 213.065 encompasses a claim against a school
district for student-on-student sexual harassment in a public school.
Doe also asserted that the School District was liable under the “indirect”
theory set forth in Section 213.065.2, as he claimed that the School District,
by its actions and inactions in failing to protect him from the harassment and
assaults, was responsible for denying him the full and equal use and enjoyment
of the public school and its services. The
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that because Section 213.065.2 alternatively
prohibits a person from “indirectly” denying the benefits of a public
accommodation, the statute also contemplates liability for a party who does not
personally engaged in the discriminatory acts but who is responsible for the
denial of the advantages, facilities, services or privileges of a public
accommodation that results from another's discriminatory acts. The court noted that a school district
exercises significant control over its students through its disciplinary
policy. And because it has such control
over its students, a school district's failure to take prompt and effective
remedial action to address a student's sexually harassing and sexually
assaulting another student has the potential to deny the aggrieved student the
full and equal use and enjoyment of the advantages, facilities, services and
privileges of the public school. Thus, the
court found that the Section 213.065 encompasses a claim against a school
district for student-on-student sexual harassment in a public school.
Finally, the
court reiterated that an employer is liable under Section 213.055.1(1)(a) for
the sexual harassment of one co-worker by another if the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective
remedial action. After a lengthy
analysis, the court held that the standard for a public school district's
liability for student-on-student sexual harassment under the MHRA should be the
same as that for an employer's liability for co-worker sexual harassment under
the MHRA. In other words, a public school
district can be held liable if it knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.
court reiterated that an employer is liable under Section 213.055.1(1)(a) for
the sexual harassment of one co-worker by another if the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective
remedial action. After a lengthy
analysis, the court held that the standard for a public school district's
liability for student-on-student sexual harassment under the MHRA should be the
same as that for an employer's liability for co-worker sexual harassment under
the MHRA. In other words, a public school
district can be held liable if it knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.
Based upon the
foregoing, and construing Doe's petition liberally and according it all
reasonable inferences deducible from the facts stated, the Missouri Court of
Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and held that Doe sufficiently stated
a cause of action under Section 213.065 for discrimination in a public
accommodation based on student-on-student sexual harassment.
foregoing, and construing Doe's petition liberally and according it all
reasonable inferences deducible from the facts stated, the Missouri Court of
Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and held that Doe sufficiently stated
a cause of action under Section 213.065 for discrimination in a public
accommodation based on student-on-student sexual harassment.
Weiss Attorneys at Law provides
guidance and representation regarding all types of employment matters,
including sexual harassment and sexual discrimination claims. If confronted with an employment issue,
please contact the employment law attorneys at Weiss Attorneys at Law.
guidance and representation regarding all types of employment matters,
including sexual harassment and sexual discrimination claims. If confronted with an employment issue,
please contact the employment law attorneys at Weiss Attorneys at Law.
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